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Not All Stereotypic Biases Are Created Equal:
Evidence for a Stereotype-Disconfirming Bias
Natalie A. Wyer
Free University of Amsterdam
Stereotype-confirming biases are well documented in the social
psychological literature. However, motivations to disconfirm
social stereotypes may be more influential for unprejudiced indi-
viduals. Three experiments are presented that test the hypothesis
that extremely unprejudiced people exhibit a bias toward stereo-
type disconfirmation. Experiment 1 investigates stereotype
disconfirmation in information-seeking preferences. Experi-
ments 2 and 3 explore attributional strategies for stereotype
disconfirmation. In all experiments, unprejudiced participants
respond in ways reflecting a motivation to disconfirm social ste-
reotypes. Implications for stereotype change and stereotypic
influences on judgment and behavior are discussed.
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People only see what they are prepared to see.
—Ralph Waldo Emerson
The capacity of humans to perceive a single reality in
vastly different ways is well documented. Indeed, a great
deal of social and cognitive research has been devoted to
uncovering the many ways in which people may be
biased in their interpretation of an event. One of the
most robust examples of such a bias is that people tend to
explain outcomes differently depending on the actor
who produced the outcome. Research on self-serving
and group-serving attributional biases (e.g., Hewstone,
1990; Hewstone & Jaspers, 1982; Miller & Ross, 1975) has
demonstrated a clear role of motivational processes in
producing divergent interpretations of a single event.
People are more likely to explain positive outcomes
experienced by themselves or their ingroups in terms of
dispositional characteristics and negative outcomes in
terms of situational ones, compared to when other indi-
viduals or groups experience those outcomes.
A common explanation for self-serving and group-
serving biases is that they are driven by differential ex-
pectations (Deaux, 1976; Miller & Ross, 1975). Specifi-
cally, when considering an event that is consistent with
personality-based or stereotype-based expectations, peo-
ple tend to make dispositional attributions. In contrast,
when an event contradicts those expectations, people
search for a situational explanation, thereby resolving
the apparent discrepancy between their beliefs and the
event that contradicts them.
Stereotypic biases in attributional reasoning have
been demonstrated in a number of domains. For exam-
ple, a number of researchers have reported that partici-
pants attribute failure to internal causes when experi-
enced by a racial outgroup but to external causes when
experienced by the ingroup (Chatman & von Hippel,
2001; Jackson, Sullivan, & Hodge, 1993; Whitehead,
Smith, & Eichhorn, 1982). Moreover, Wigboldus,
Dijksterhuis, and van Knippenberg (2003) recently re-
ported a series of studies indicating that spontaneous
trait attributions are more likely to be made in response
to stereotype-consistent than stereotype-inconsistent
behaviors.
In other research, Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein
(1987; see also Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000) found that
participants were more likely to judge a defendant to be
guilty when he was identified as Latino than when his
race was not made salient, suggesting a stereotype-
confirming bias in the attribution of responsibility for a
crime. In addition, Power, Murphy, and Coover (1996)
demonstrated that salient stereotypes increased the
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extent to which Black public figures (Rodney King and
Magic Johnson) were held personally responsible for
their negative life events.
Stereotypic attributional biases are not only mani-
fested in explicit tasks involving the generation of expla-
nations for behavior. Their influence can be seen in
more subtle ways as well. For example, Maass, Salvi,
Arcuri, and Semin (1989) introduced evidence of a “lin-
guistic intergroup bias.” Their research indicated that
people are more likely to use abstract trait words to de-
scribe positive ingroup and negative outgroup behaviors
but to produce more concrete and context-based de-
scriptions for negative ingroup and positive outgroup
behaviors. This pattern is entirely consistent with a ste-
reotypic attributional bias in that dispositional attribu-
tions are more easily drawn from expectancy-consistent
events than expectancy-inconsistent events. Support for
this interpretation was provided by subsequent research
by Maass and her colleagues (Maass, Milesi, Zabbini, &
Stahlberg, 1995), which suggested that expectations
rather than ingroup protection motives were responsi-
ble for the linguistic intergroup bias.
PREJUDICE-BASED DIFFERENCES
IN THE STEREOTYPIC ATTRIBUTIONAL BIAS
Although the stereotypic attributional bias seems to
be fairly robust, it may be influenced by individual differ-
ences in stereotypic or prejudicial beliefs. For example,
Pettigrew (1979; see also Greenberg & Rosenfield, 1979)
suggested that prejudice might moderate the “ultimate
attribution error.” He proposed that prejudiced, more
so than unprejudiced, individuals should tend to attrib-
ute negative acts by the outgroup to internal causes and
positive acts by the outgroup to external causes.
There is empirical evidence to support the conten-
tion that stereotypic attributional biases are moderated
by personal beliefs. For example, Greenberg and
Rosenfield (1979) reported that highly ethnocentric
participants were more likely to show stereotypic biases
in their attributions for ESP ability than were less
ethnocentric participants. Furthermore, Garland and
Price (1977) found that people with more positive atti-
tudes toward women in management positions were
more likely to attribute a female manager’s success to
internal causes than were those with more negative
attitudes.
A more recent line of research by von Hippel,
Sekaquaptewa, and their colleagues (Sekaquaptewa,
Espinoza, Thompson, Vargas, & von Hippel, 2003; von
Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas, 1997) has suggested
a clear link between prejudice and attributional reason-
ing about stereotype-related events. Taking a novel ap-
proach, they have used the strength of stereotypic
attributional biases as an implicit measure of prejudice.
That is, they argued that the extent to which an individ-
ual shows such attributional biases could be viewed as an
indication of their prejudicial beliefs. Consistent with
this proposition, von Hippel et al. (1997) found that the
strength of the linguistic intergroup bias, described
above, was a significant predictor of prejudicial judg-
ments of Black and female targets. Furthermore,
Sekaquaptewa et al. (2003) reported the magnitude of
participants’ “stereotypic explanatory bias” (i.e., the ex-
tent to which participants engage in attributional rea-
soning in response to stereotypic versus counterstereo-
typic events) was a significant predictor of their behavior
toward a Black confederate.
LACK OF STEREOTYPE CONFIRMATION ≠
STEREOTYPE DISCONFIRMATION
These studies are suggestive of a relationship between
prejudice and stereotypic attributional biases. The gen-
eral picture to emerge from this research is that preju-
diced people are more likely to display the bias than are
unprejudiced people. This is quite consistent with intu-
itive notions regarding the extent to which prejudiced
and unprejudiced individuals should be motivated to
maintain their stereotypic beliefs.
Yet, there has been surprisingly little research into the
role of prejudice in moderating stereotype-confirming
biases. Moreover, the vast majority of research on preju-
dice and stereotyping has been devoted to demon-
strating the extent to which the presence of preju-
dice predicts the presence of stereotype-confirming,
information-processing strategies. This emphasis neces-
sarily neglects the possibility of an unprejudiced
counterpart to prejudiced individuals’ biases.
Here, “unprejudiced” refers not simply to individuals
who do not have highly stereotypic beliefs about an
outgroup but rather to individuals who actively reject
such beliefs. Individuals for whom egalitarian values are
highly important and self-defining may not only fail to
endorse negative cultural stereotypes but may be moti-
vated to disconfirm them. One intriguing possibility is
that the very same processes may be involved for unprej-
udiced people seeking to disconfirm social stereotypes
as for prejudiced people seeking to confirm them.1
The motivation to disconfirm cultural stereotypes
may be based on past experiences in which negative
emotional consequences resulted from being influ-
enced by stereotypic beliefs. For example, Monteith and
her colleagues have reported numerous studies in which
unprejudiced individuals experienced guilt upon believ-
ing that they had behaved in a discriminatory manner
(Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Monteith,
1993; Monteith, Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993). Fur-
thermore, unprejudiced individuals were found to en-
gage in reparative behavior after being informed that
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they had made stereotypic or discriminatory judgments
(Monteith, 1993). To prevent stereotypic responding
in the future, and thereby forestalling the necessity of
reparative behavior, unprejudiced individuals may
learn (over time) to adopt an active stereotype-
disconfirmation strategy.
MOTIVATED STEREOTYPE INHIBITION
The notion that individuals will, under some condi-
tions, spontaneously choose to inhibit social stereotypes
is not new to social psychology. Throughout the past 10
to 15 years, a large number of studies have accumulated
that demonstrate stereotype inhibition in various forms,
at either a conscious or unconscious level (e.g., Devine,
1989; Galinsky & Moskowitz , 2000; Macrae,
Bodenhausen, Milne, & Ford, 1997; Macrae,
Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994; Macrae,
Bodenhausen, Milne, & Wheeler, 1996; Monteith,
Spicer, & Tooman, 1998; Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, &
Schaal, 1999; Sinclair & Kunda, 1999; Wyer, Sherman, &
Stroessner, 1998, 2000; for reviews, see Bodenhausen &
Macrae, 1998; Kunda & Sinclair, 1999). For example,
following Macrae et al.’s (1994) initial demonstration of
stereotype suppression and its consequences, a number
of studies identified conditions in which stereotype sup-
pression may be voluntarily chosen by individuals wish-
ing to avoid stereotypic influences. For example, Wyer
et al. (1998, 2000) reported that situational factors could
motivate the initiation or continuation of stereotype sup-
pression (see also Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne,
1998). Furthermore, Monteith et al. (1998) found that
prejudice moderated the consequences of stereotype
suppression. In particular, their results indicated that
unprejudiced individuals are not always subject to ste-
reotype “rebound” (i.e., the increase in stereotype acces-
sibility that typically follows suppression). This may re-
flect unprejudiced individuals’ skill at suppressing
stereotypes or it may indicate that unprejudiced people
simply do not represent the stereotype in the same way.
For example, if stereotypes were not salient in the first
place, instructions to suppress them would have little
effect on their accessibility. In either case, it seems that
the unprejudiced participants in their research were
successful in reducing the extent to which cultural
stereotypes were activated and applied.
Other research has highlighted the powerful influ-
ence of motivation on stereotype activation and inhibi-
tion. Sinclair and Kunda (1999; Kunda & Sinclair, 1999)
have reported a number of experiments that suggest that
stereotype accessibility may be inhibited in conditions
where people are motivated to view a target person in
nonstereotypic ways. For example, Sinclair and Kunda
(1999) found that when participants received positive
feedback from a Black doctor, they inhibited stereotypes
about Blacks. Thus, when self-enhancement motives are
served by viewing others in nonstereotypic ways, people
are capable of inhibiting stereotypes that would other-
wise be activated. If self-enhancement motives have the
potential to instigate stereotype inhibition, other mo-
tives may serve a similar function. In particular, unpreju-
diced individuals may possess value-based motives to
inhibit stereotypes, and they may do so by engaging in
systematic stereotype disconfirmation.
OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT RESEARCH
Three studies are presented here, each of which
tested the hypothesis that unprejudiced individuals are
motivated to disconfirm stereotypes of Blacks. The first
of these studies used an information-seeking paradigm.
The following two experiments employed attributional
paradigms. In each case, prejudice was predicted to in-
fluence the extent to which participants used stereotype-
confirming or -disconfirming information-seeking or
attributional strategies.
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 used an information-seeking paradigm
to test the hypothesis that unprejudiced individuals seek
out information that is likely to provide disconfirmation
of cultural stereotypes. Information seeking has been
suggested by Johnston (1996; Johnston & Macrae, 1994;
see also Skov & Sherman, 1986) to be one strategy
through which people maintain existing stereotypes. In
that research, participants were given the opportunity to
select information to learn about members of a stereo-
typed group. Participants showed a marked tendency to
choose stereotype-consistent information and were con-
sequently able to maintain their stereotypes. The pres-
ent study investigated the influence of prejudice on such
information-seeking strategies.
Method
PARTICIPANTS
Sixty-seven undergraduate students at the University
of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB), participated in this
experiment. Participants were recruited from a larger
pool of students who had participated in a mass-testing
session earlier in the academic term, during which they
completed the Modern Racism Scale (MRS; McConahay,
1986). Participants were paid U.S.$5 for participating in
the experiment, which took approximately 45 min. No
Black participants took part in the experiment.
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE
After arriving at the laboratory, participants were
introduced to a study on “impression formation.” Par-
ticipants were asked to read short descriptions of four
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individuals and to choose the one about whom they
wished to learn during the subsequent impression for-
mation task. The descriptions of the targets varied in
both race and the extent to which they confirmed cul-
tural stereotypes. Two of the descriptions identified the
target as a Black man, whereas the other two identified
the target as a White man. In addition, one target of each
race was described in ways that confirmed the Black ste-
reotype but disconfirmed the White stereotype (e.g., un-
educated, having a job doing menial labor), whereas the
other was described in ways that confirmed the White
stereotype but disconfirmed the Black stereotype (e.g.,
educated, having a white-collar job). Participants’
choice of target was recorded.
After choosing the target person about whom they
wanted to learn, all participants were presented with
identical information about the target. This information
consisted of 16 statements, 8 of which described negative
behaviors and 8 of which described positive behaviors.
All of the behaviors were neutral with respect to both the
White and Black stereotypes. After reading the state-
ments, participants rated the target on a number of posi-
tive and negative trait dimensions.
Results
TARGET CHOICE
Participants’ choices of target were analyzed using
multinomial logistic regression, in which target choice
was entered as the dependent variable and scores on the
MRS2 were entered as the independent variable. MRS
significantly predicted target choice, χ2(3) = 12.360, p =
.006. Binary logistic regressions were then conducted
to investigate the relationship between MRS and prob-
abilities of choosing stereotype-confirming (vs. discon-
firming) and White (vs. Black) targets.3 First, MRS was
significantly and positively related (B = .410) to choice of
a stereotype-confirming target, Wald = 5.154, p = .023.
Furthermore, MRS was significantly and positively re-
lated (B = .579) to choice of a White target, Wald = 5.793,
p = .016. Frequencies are displayed in Table 1 (for ease of
interpretation, cell frequencies are presented by level of
prejudice, which is based on a median split of MRS
scores).
IMPRESSIONS OF THE TARGET
Participants’ evaluations of the target person also
were analyzed. A principal components analysis (PCA)
with varimax rotation was used to identify clusters of
traits that could be combined for the purposes of analy-
sis. The PCA identified three distinct factors: general
positivity (friendly, respectful, likeable, lazy [reverse
scored], and aggressive [reverse-scored]); sociability
(outgoing, shy [reverse-scored], and passive [reverse
scored]); and competence (intelligent, hardworking).
The traits included in each factor had average loadings
of .724, .700, and .816, respectively.
The three trait factors were entered as a repeated
measure in a three-way multivariate analysis of co-
variance (MANCOVA) in which target choice was en-
tered as an independent variable and MRS was entered
as a covariate.4 The analysis revealed only a significant
main effect of the trait factor, F(2, 120) = 4.183, p = .018.
Paired comparisons indicated that ratings were highest
on traits in the competence factor (M = 7.875, SD = .803),
followed by the general positivity factor (M = 6.803, SD =
.870) and the sociability factor (M = 5.098, SD = 1.081).
All pairwise comparisons were significant, smallest
t(67) = 9.234, p < .001.
Discussion
Prior research has demonstrated an expectancy-
confirming bias in information seeking. People tend
to look for information that they have reason to believe
will be consistent with their expectations. In past re-
search on stereotyping, this bias has been translated into
a stereotype-confirming bias: Participants in a number
of studies (Johnston, 1996; Johnston & Macrae, 1994)
have shown a preference for stereotype-confirming
information.
The results of the present study, however, cast doubt
on the universality of such a bias. When participants in
this study were presented with four potential individuals
about whom they could spend some time forming an im-
pression, prejudiced and unprejudiced participants in-
dicated clearly different preferences. As shown in Table
1, prejudiced participants showed an overwhelming
preference for learning about stereotype-confirming
targets. They were three times as likely to choose to learn
about someone who could be expected to confirm cul-
tural stereotypes than someone who was likely to
disconfirm them. Furthermore, prejudiced individuals
were twice as likely as unprejudiced individuals to
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TABLE 1: Participants’ Choice of Target, by Level of Prejudice
(based on a median split of MRS scores), Target Race,
and Target Consistency With Cultural Stereotypes
(Experiment 1)
Consistent Targets Inconsistent Targets
Black White Total Black White Total
Unprejudiced 6 6 12 20 6 26
(32%) (68%)
Prejudiced 14 9 23 7 0 7
(77%) (23%)
NOTE: Consistent targets include the relatively high-status White tar-
get and the relatively low-status Black target. Inconsistent targets in-
clude the relatively low-status White target and the relatively high-
status Black target.
choose a stereotype-confirming target. In contrast, un-
prejudiced participants showed a marked preference for
learning about stereotype-disconfirming targets. They
were twice as likely to choose a stereotype-disconfirming
target as opposed to a stereotype-confirming one, and
they were nearly three times as likely as prejudiced
participants to select a stereotype-disconfirming target.
Taken in the context of past research on the role of ex-
pectations in information seeking, these results might
suggest that prejudiced and unprejudiced individuals
differ in their expectations. However, it seems unlikely
that unprejudiced individuals actually have expectations
that are exactly opposite of those dictated by cultural ste-
reotypes. Common conceptions of prejudice would be
more likely to predict that unprejudiced individuals sim-
ply have weaker expectancies than do prejudiced indi-
viduals. If so, their choices in this experiment should
have been randomly distributed across the four targets.
Instead, they appeared to seek out the very information
that would be most likely to disconfirm existing stereo-
types. Thus, a more plausible interpretation of these re-
sults is that unprejudiced individuals are motivated to
disconfirm social stereotypes, and they use biased
information-seeking strategies to do so.
Somewhat surprisingly, neither prejudice nor charac-
teristics of the target had any effect on participants’ ulti-
mate impressions of him. One might have expected that
participants would form impressions that were
evaluatively consistent with the stereotype of the target
they had chosen. The target was described by a combina-
tion of negative and positive behaviors; thus, partici-
pants’ expectations might be predicted to bias their at-
tention to and interpretation of expectancy-consistent
behaviors. Yet, no biases in interpretation were evi-
denced in their subsequent impressions. Thus, we are
left with the question of why participants’ evaluations
were relatively unaffected by their personal beliefs or by
target characteristics. One possibility is that a variety of
attributional processes were engaged by both preju-
diced and unprejudiced participants to reconcile the
range of behaviors that they encountered. One purpose
of Experiment 2 will be to investigate attributional rea-
soning by prejudiced and unprejudiced individuals in
response to stereotype-confirming and -disconfirming
information.
EXPERIMENT 2
Unprejudiced individuals appear to take a proactive
role in seeking out stereotype-disconfirming informa-
tion. Yet, despite their efforts to seek such information,
there may be times when they encounter information
that appears to confirm cultural stereotypes. In such cir-
cumstances, unprejudiced individuals may employ
specific attributional strategies to deal with stereotype-
confirming events. Both prejudiced and unprejudiced
individuals should exhibit biases in their attributions for
stereotype-relevant behaviors, but the nature of those
biases should differ in systematic ways. People tend to
search for external or situational causes for others’ be-
havior only when the behavior is unexpected. In other
words, the default attribution is an internal one (Heider,
1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Ross, 1977; Winter & Uleman,
1984), and only unexpected events trigger an alternative
response. For prejudiced individuals, behaviors that
conform to their stereotype-based expectancies should
not elicit any special response and should therefore be
attributed to dispositional causes. In contrast, behaviors
that violate their stereotype-based expectancies should
initiate a search for situational explanations. For unprej-
udiced individuals, however, a reverse pattern may be
predicted. For such individuals, who seek out and
thereby should not need to discount stereotype-
disconfirming information, counterstereotypic behav-
iors should not trigger attempts to find an external ex-
planation and, thus, a dispositional inference should be
made. In contrast, stereotypic behaviors should be
relatively threatening to unprejudiced individuals’
beliefs and thus should be dealt with by seeking situa-
tional explanations.
Sherman, Stroessner, and Azam (in press) have re-
cently obtained relatively direct evidence for a moderat-
ing effect of prejudice on stereotypic attributional bi-
ases. Using a sentence-completion paradigm, Sherman
et al. asked participants to provide extensions for a num-
ber of stereotypic and counterstereotypic behaviors that
were exhibited by a gay male target person about whom
they had previously formed an impression. The results of
their research revealed a stereotype-confirming bias
among prejudiced participants. Specifically, these par-
ticipants produced more internal attributions for stereo-
typic behaviors and external attributions for counter-
stereotypic behaviors. No such attributional bias was
observed for unprejudiced participants. Although no
stereotype-disconfirming bias among unprejudiced in-
dividuals was found in this research, the fact that partici-
pants had already formed an impression of the target
may have eliminated the need to engage in disconfirma-
tion processes. Indeed, other measures collected in
Sherman et al.’s research suggested that unprejudiced
participants had engaged in much more integrative and
individuating processing while forming their impres-
sions than did prejudiced participants. Prejudiced par-
ticipants, who did not form individuated impressions of
the target, persisted in viewing him as representative of
the group and thus employed stereotype-confirming
strategies in generating attributions for his behavior. In
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contrast, once unprejudiced participants had success-
fully individuated the target person, he would not be
seen as merely a representative of the stereotyped group.
Thus, attributions for his behavior would have had little
relevance for beliefs about the cultural stereotype. A
quite different pattern of results might be expected had
unprejudiced participants not successfully individuated
the target person.
In the present experiment, participants were asked to
provide explanations for a series of behaviors, each of
which was attributed to a different target person who was
identified as being either Black or White. The behaviors
were stereotypic, counterstereotypic, or neutral with re-
spect to the Black stereotype. It was hypothesized that
participants should exhibit attributional biases in the
extent to which they explain each behavior in terms of
internal or external causes. However, the nature of this
bias was expected to differ depending on participants’
prejudicial beliefs. Prejudiced participants were pre-
dicted to display the standard stereotypic attributional
bias. In other words, they should attribute stereotypic
behaviors to internal causes and counterstereotypic be-
haviors to external causes. In contrast, unprejudiced
participants were predicted to show a counterstereotypic
attributional bias; that is, they should be more likely to at-
tribute counterstereotypic behaviors to internal causes
and stereotypic behaviors to external causes.
Method
PARTICIPANTS
Eighty-four undergraduate students at UCSB partici-
pated in this experiment. Participants were again re-
cruited from a larger pool of students who had com-
pleted the MRS during an earlier mass-testing session.
Participants were paid U.S.$5 for their participation in
the primary experiment, which took 30 to 40 min. No
Black individuals participated in the experiment.
DESIGN
The experiment involved a 2 × 3 within-participants
design, involving target race (White or Black) and behav-
ior stereotypicality (Black stereotypic, Black counter-
stereotypic, or neutral).
MATERIALS
A series of 48 statements, each describing a specific
behavior, appeared in a response booklet in one of two
random orders. Response booklets were constructed
such that one statement appeared on each page of the
booklet. The statements were selected from a larger pool
of statements that had been previously rated by a sepa-
rate group of 30 participants (recruited from the same
participant pool) for their consistency with the Black ste-
reotype. These ratings were made on a scale from –3
(highly inconsistent) to +3 (highly consistent).
Sixteen statements were selected for each behavior
type (Black stereotypic, Black counterstereotypic, and
neutral). There were approximately equal numbers of
evaluatively positive and negative behaviors within each
type. Black stereotypic behaviors (e.g., told a dirty joke to
his friends, was the DJ at the party) received an average
rating of +1.94. Black counterstereotypic behaviors (e.g.,
wouldn’t dance at the club, walked away from the fight)
received an average rating of –1.88. Neutral behaviors
(e.g., spilled his drink on the table, made breakfast for
his girlfriend) received an average rating of 0.02. Aver-
age ratings for each behavior were determined to be sig-
nificantly different from one another using a one-way
ANOVA, F(2, 47) = 695.595, p < 001. Bonferroni post hoc
tests confirmed that all pairwise differences were signifi-
cant, p < .001. Statements in each condition were
matched for social desirability and were neutral with re-
spect to stereotypes of Whites (average ratings of White
stereotypicality for each type ranged from –0.40 to
+0.47). A one-way ANOVA confirmed that the three
types of behaviors did not differ in their stereotypicality
of Whites, F(2, 47) = 2.386, p > .10.
Forty-eight photographic slides were used. These
slides included photographs of 24 White men and 24
Black men. The photographs were matched for age and
physical attractiveness.
PROCEDURE
After arriving at the laboratory, participants were in-
formed that the experiment concerned how people use
the appearance of others as a cue to explaining their be-
havior. Participants were instructed that they would view
a number of photographs, each of a different person.
For each photograph, they would read a statement de-
scribing something that the person had recently done.
Participants were told to look at each photograph and to
write down an explanation for why the person had per-
formed the behavior described. They were allowed 30 s
to generate the explanation.
The order of the slides and of the behavioral state-
ments was such that each statement was presented with a
Black face for half of the participants and with a White
face for the other half. Furthermore, for each partici-
pant, half of the statements describing each type of be-
havior (Black stereotypic, Black counterstereotypic, and
neutral) appeared with a Black face, whereas the other
half of the statements appeared with a White face.
Results
CODING RESPONSES
Two independent and trained coders read and
judged each response. Responses were coded as internal
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attributions if the explanation produced reflected dis-
positional qualities of the actor. Responses were coded as
external attributions if the explanation reflected charac-
teristics of the situation or environment. The two coders
were reasonably reliable (r = .79). When differences
occurred, they were resolved through discussion
between both coders and the author.
A small number of the total responses (4.3%) did not
reflect an attribution and thus were excluded from fur-
ther analyses. These responses were randomly distrib-
uted across participants and experimental conditions.
ATTRIBUTIONS
The proportion of internal (to total) attributions was
calculated for each trial type for each participant. An
analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was conducted in
which target race and behavior stereotypicality were en-
tered as within-subjects factors, and MRS scores5 were en-
tered as a covariate. MRS was expected to moderate the
extent to which participants displayed a stereotype-con-
firming bias, such that the bias would be strongest
among more prejudiced (higher MRS) participants and
reverse itself among unprejudiced (lower MRS) partici-
pants. This pattern would be reflected by a significant
three-way interaction between prejudice, target race,
and behavior stereotypicality. As predicted, this interac-
tion was in fact significant, F(2, 81) = 10.396, p < .001.
Simple regression analyses were conducted to deter-
mine the relationship between MRS scores and the pro-
portion of internal behaviors generated in each condi-
tion. MRS significantly predicted internal attributions to
Black stereotypic behaviors performed by Black targets,
β = .279, p = .010, but not by White targets, β = .096, p =
.386 (see Figure 1, top panel). Furthermore, MRS pre-
dicted internal attributions to Black counterstereotypic
behaviors performed by Black targets, β = –.262, p = .016,
but only marginally predicted attributions for the same
behaviors performed by White targets, β = .208, p = .057
(see Figure 1, bottom panel). Finally, MRS did not signif-
icantly predict internal attributions for neutral behav-
iors performed by either Black targets,β = –.095, p = .393,
or White targets, β = .065, p = .560.
EVIDENCE OF STEREOTYPIC BIASES
To evaluate the hypothesis that unprejudiced individ-
uals would display a pattern of stereotype-disconfirming
attributions, further analyses were conducted for partici-
pants scoring at the low end of the MRS (i.e., scores of –7
and less). A two-way repeated-measures ANOVA was con-
ducted on the attributions produced by these partici-
pants. This analysis revealed only a significant Target
Race × Behavior Stereotypicality interaction, F(2, 76) =
4.704, p = .012. Consistent with the hypotheses, unpreju-
diced participants showed a (nonsignificant) tendency
to produce fewer internal attributions for Black stereo-
typic behaviors when those behaviors were performed by
Black targets than by White targets, t(38) = 1.627, p =
.112. In contrast, they generated a higher proportion of
internal attributions for Black counterstereotypic behav-
iors when those behaviors were performed by Blacks
than by Whites, t(38) = 2.062, p = .046. This pattern
reflects a stereotype-disconfirming bias by unprejudiced
participants (see Table 2).
The parallel analysis was conducted on the attribu-
tions produced by participants scoring in the medium to
high range on the MRS (–7 and greater). Contrary to
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Figure 1 Proportion of attributions made to internal causes for
behaviors consistent with Black stereotypes (top panel) and
inconsistent with Black stereotypes (bottom panel) as a
function of Modern Racism Scale (MRS) scores and target
race (Experiment 2).
NOTE: Mean MRS = –6.650; standard deviation = 5.574.
predictions, the interaction between target race and be-
havior stereotypicality was not significant, F(2, 88) < 1.
The main effect of target race was significant, F(1, 44) =
5.758, p = .021, such that prejudiced participants gener-
ated a higher proportion of internal attributions in re-
sponse to the same behaviors when they were performed
by White targets than when they were performed by
Black targets. There was also a significant main effect of
behavior stereotypicality, F(2, 88) = 10.429, p < .001, indi-
cating that neutral behaviors inspired fewer internal
attributions than did stereotypic or counterstereotypic
behaviors.
Discussion
The results of this experiment were largely consistent
with the hypothesis that unprejudiced individuals would
display a stereotype-disconfirming bias in their attri-
butions for Black and White targets’ behaviors. Un-
prejudiced participants were less likely to generate inter-
nal attributions for Black than White targets when the
behavior confirmed the Black stereotype. In contrast,
unprejudiced participants were more likely to make in-
ternal attributions for Black than White targets when the
behavior was counter to the Black stereotype. In other
words, unprejudiced participants were more likely to
find situational explanations for stereotype-confirming
behaviors while tending to draw dispositional inferences
from stereotype-disconfirming behaviors.
Contrary to expectations, however, relatively preju-
diced participants did not show a systematic bias toward
stereotype confirmation. Rather, they were less likely to
make internal attributions regarding any type of behav-
ior performed by Black than White targets. This finding
suggests one of two possible conclusions. First, relatively
prejudiced participants may view Blacks as more affected
by situational factors than Whites, who may be seen as
having more freedom to behave in ways consistent with
their personalities. In other words, prejudiced individu-
als may view Whites as having greater self-efficacy than
Blacks.
A second explanation for the pattern of attributions
generated by prejudiced participants is that their sen-
tence completions were motivated by self-presentational
concerns. Given that social norms discourage people
from making overgeneralizations about members of ste-
reotyped groups, prejudiced participants may have been
more cautious about generating dispositional explana-
tions for Blacks’ behavior. That is, relatively prejudiced
individuals may have actually shown a stereotype-
confirming bias in their attributions if they had not been
able to monitor their responses. A third experiment was
designed to investigate this possibility.
EXPERIMENT 3
Gilbert, Pelham, and Krull (1988; see also Jones &
Davis, 1965, Trope, 1986; Trope & Alfieri, 1997) illus-
trated that attributional reasoning is a multistage pro-
cess. After witnessing and identifying a behavior, individ-
uals first judge its trait implications and then make
corrections for situational constraints that may have pro-
duced the behavior (and thereby mitigate a disposi-
tional inference). As a special case of attributional rea-
soning, stereotypic attributional biases are also the result
of a multistage process. Individuals proceed through the
same stages of classification, characterization, and cor-
rection as described by Gilbert and his colleagues. How-
ever, as proposed in this article, the correction stage may
be influenced by the perceivers’ personal beliefs about
the perpetrator of the behavior (Vonk & Konst, 1998). If
the behavior conflicts with those beliefs, a search for situ-
ational constraints is more likely to be undertaken than
if the behavior is consistent with what the perceiver ex-
pects. Consequently, correction processes are more
likely to ensue following expectancy violations.
According to Gilbert et al. (1988), later stages of the
attribution process (i.e., correction) are less automatic
than earlier stages and therefore require greater cogni-
tive resources. As such, interference with a perceiver’s
cognitive capacity should tend to result in stronger dis-
positional attributions. However, when the search for sit-
uational constraints is congruent with perceivers’ per-
sonal beliefs, correction may not be as easily disrupted.
Indeed, if individuals are highly practiced at making situ-
ational corrections for certain types of behavior, those
correction processes should be quite difficult to inter-
rupt (Trope & Alfieri, 1997; but see Franco & Maass,
1996). Specifically, relatively unprejudiced individuals
may be more practiced at producing situational cor-
rections for stereotype-confirming behaviors, whereas
relatively prejudiced individuals may be more skillful
at finding situational factors to explain stereotype-
disconfirming behaviors.
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TABLE 2: Proportions of Internal (to total) Attributions
Generated, by Prejudice Level, Target Race, and
Behavior Stereotypicality (Experiment 2)
Unprejudiced Prejudiced
Black White Black White
Target Target Target Target
Black stereotypic .744 .804 .769 .830
(.211) (.187) (.183) (.184)
Neutral .747 .739 .702 .751
(.173) (.220) (.218) (.182)
Black counterstereotypic .812 .710 .792 .857
(.183) (.175) (.205) (.160)
In contrast, processes related to self-presentational
motives should be disrupted by decreased cognitive
capacity. Researchers such as Paulhus (1993; Paulhus,
Graf, & van Selst, 1989; see also Pontari & Schlenker,
2000) have argued that self-presentational strategies can
be disrupted when a cognitive load is imposed. For
example, Paulhus et al. (1989) reported that partici-
pants endorsed more positive self-evaluations when
placed under a cognitive load. This suggests that self-
presentational concerns (e.g., a motive not to appear
conceited) may lose their influence when cognitive
capacity is drained.
Experiment 3 investigated the role of cognitive
capacity in the production of stereotype-confirming and
-disconfirming attributional biases by manipulating the
extent to which participants were under time pressure to
make a response. Following from the reasoning above,
two competing hypotheses may be derived. If responses
by prejudiced participants in Experiment 2 were driven
primarily by self-presentational concerns, then they
should revert to stereotype-confirming biases when their
ability to engage in correction is disrupted (see Gordon
& Anderson, 1995). In this case, the pattern of attribu-
tions found for prejudiced participants in Experiment 2
should be replicated only under control conditions.
Under conditions of limited capacity (i.e., time
pressure), they should display a stereotype-confirming
attributional pattern.
Alternatively, if the results of Experiment 2 were
driven by prejudiced and unprejudiced individuals
having different levels of skill at correcting for potential
situational constraints when it comes to stereotype-
confirming and -disconfirming behaviors, then limiting
cognitive capacity should have little effect on the attribu-
tions that they report. In this case, the pattern of attribu-
tions for both prejudiced and unprejudiced participants
should be similar to that found in Experiment 2 regard-
less of whether they are required to respond under time
pressure. Experiment 3 was designed to discriminate be-
tween these two possibilities by imposing a time limit on
participants’ production of attributions.
Method
PARTICIPANTS
One hundred and seven students at the University of
Colorado participated in this experiment in exchange
for partial credit toward fulfillment of an introductory
psychology requirement. No Black individuals partici-
pated in the experiment. The primary experiment lasted
for approximately 20 to 30 min.
DESIGN
The experiment involved a 2 × 2 × 3 mixed-
participants design. Time pressure (time pressure or
control) was manipulated between participants. Target
race (Black or White) and behavior stereotypicality
(Black stereotypic, Black counterstereotypic, or neutral)
were varied within participants.
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE
After arriving at the laboratory, participants were
seated in individual cubicles. They were informed that
they would be completing a number of unrelated tasks
during the course of an hour. In the first phase of the ex-
periment, they were introduced to an attribution task
similar to that described in Experiment 2. Prior to begin-
ning the task, participants received an explanation of
how responsibility for a behavior may be distributed be-
tween internal/dispositional and external/situational
causes.
There were a number of other important changes
to the procedures followed in Experiment 2. First,
Macintosh computers were used to present target photo-
graphs and behavioral descriptions. The photographs
and descriptions appeared simultaneously on the com-
puter screen in random order. The change from a paper-
and-pencil task to a computerized task was made to allow
a manipulation of time pressure to be included in the ex-
periment. Participants in the time pressure condition
were required to enter their response within 5 s of the
time that the statement appeared on the screen. After
5 s, a warning beep occurred and participants were told
that they would be automatically taken to the next trial
of the experiment. Participants in the control condi-
tion were allowed to complete each trial without a time
deadline.
To allow participants to make a complete response
within the amount of time given in the time pressure
condition, participants gave a numerical estimate of the
proportion of responsibility that could be attributed to
the target. Thus, after each photograph and description
appeared, participants were instructed to type in a num-
ber from 0% to 100% to indicate the extent to which
responsibility for the behavior should be attributed to
internal/dispositional causes. After completing the at-
tribution task, participants spent approximately 25 min
on unrelated activities, after which they completed the
MRS.
Results
ATTRIBUTIONS
The average percentage of responsibility attributed
internally in each condition was calculated and these
averages were analyzed using a MANCOVA, in which tar-
get race and behavior stereotypicality were entered as
within-subjects factors, time pressure was entered as a
between-subjects factor, and MRS score6 was entered as
a covariate. The results indicated a significant three-way
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interaction between target race, behavior stereo-
typicality, and MRS, F(2, 206) = 5.305, p = .006. This inter-
action was not moderated by time pressure, F(2, 206) =
1.042, p = .355.
Simple regressions were conducted to identify the re-
lationship between MRS and the percentage of responsi-
bility attributed internally in each condition. The results
indicated that MRS was marginally related to internal
attributions for Black stereotypic behaviors by Black tar-
gets, β = .179, p = .065, but not to the same behaviors per-
formed by White targets, β = –.109, p = .264 (see Figure 2,
top panel). Similarly, MRS significantly predicted inter-
nal attributions to Black counterstereotypic behaviors by
Black targets, β = –.235, p = .015, but not by White targets,
β = .032, p = .745 (see Figure 2, bottom panel). Finally,
MRS was unrelated to internal attributions generated in
response to neutral behaviors by either Black, β = –.127,
p = .191, or White targets, β = –.075, p = .444.
EVIDENCE OF STEREOTYPIC BIASES
As in Experiment 2, to assess the extent to which rela-
tively unprejudiced participants displayed stereotype-
disconfirming biases, further analyses were conducted
for participants scoring at the low end of the MRS (less
than –7). A two-way repeated-measures ANOVA was con-
ducted on the attributions produced by these partici-
pants. This analysis revealed a marginal main effect of
target race, F(1, 52) = 3.064, p = .086, and a significant
main effect of behavior stereotypicality, F(2, 104) =
7.931, p = .001. These effects were qualified by a signifi-
cant Target Race ×Behavior Stereotypicality interaction,
F(2, 104) = 13.162, p < .001. Consistent with the hypothe-
ses, unprejudiced participants attributed less internal
responsibility for Black stereotypic behaviors when those
behaviors were performed by Black targets than by
White targets, t(52) = 3.007, p = .004. In contrast, they
attributed greater internal responsibility for Black
counterstereotypic behaviors when those behaviors were
performed by Blacks than by Whites, t(52) = 4.780, p <
.001. This pattern reflects a stereotype-disconfirming
bias by unprejudiced participants.
The parallel analysis was conducted on the attribu-
tions produced by participants scoring in the medium to
high range on the MRS (–7 and greater). This analysis
yielded a significant main effect of behavior stereo-
typicality, F(2, 106) = 7.599, p = .001, which was qualified
by an interaction with target race, F(2, 106) = 44.331, p <
.001. Unlike the relatively unprejudiced participants
described above, more prejudiced participants made
stronger internal attributions for Black stereotypic be-
haviors when those behaviors were performed by Black
targets than by White targets, t(53) = 4.116, p < .001.
These participants also made weaker internal attribu-
tions for Black counterstereotypic behaviors when those
behaviors were performed by Black targets than by
White targets, t(53) = 2.072, p = .043. Thus, the relatively
prejudiced participants in this experiment displayed a
stereotype-confirming pattern of attributions.
A SECOND LOOK AT TIME PRESSURE
Because one of the purposes of this experiment was to
assess the possibility that the failure to find a stereotype-
confirming bias among prejudiced participants in Ex-
periment 2 was the result of relatively controlled process-
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Figure 2 Percentage of responsibility attributed internally for
behaviors consistent with Black stereotypes (top panel) and
inconsistent with Black stereotypes (bottom panel) as a
function of Modern Racism Scale (MRS) scores and target
race (Experiment 3).
NOTE: Mean MRS = –6.735; standard deviation = 4.909.
ing (i.e., the operation of self-presentational motives),
further analyses were conducted to more closely exam-
ine the effects of time pressure. Separate MANCOVAs
were conducted within the time pressure and control
conditions. Although the three-way interaction among
target race, behavior stereotypicality, and MRS was sig-
nificant in both cases, it was somewhat stronger in the
time pressure condition, F(2, 104) = 20.067, p < .001,
than in the control condition, F(2, 102) = 4.478, p = .014.
Further analyses were conducted for relatively unpreju-
diced and prejudiced participants in each condition. For
relatively unprejudiced participants, the interaction be-
tween target race and behavior stereotypicality was sig-
nificant in the time pressure condition, F(2, 50) =
12.063, p < .001, but only marginally significant in the
control condition, F(2, 50) = 2.869, p = .066. This sug-
gests that the stereotype-disconfirming bias displayed by
these participants was actually exaggerated under condi-
tions of limited capacity. Likewise, the Target Race × Be-
havior Stereotypicality interaction for relatively preju-
diced participants was significant in the time pressure
condition, F(2, 54) = 14.967, p < .001, but not in the con-
trol condition, F(2, 50) = 1.803, p = .175. This suggests
that time pressure also led to an amplification of
stereotype-confirming biases.
Discussion
Experiment 3 provided further evidence for a
stereotype-disconfirming attributional bias among un-
prejudiced individuals. Unprejudiced participants in
this experiment were again more likely to attribute Black
stereotypic behaviors to situational causes when the
actor was Black than when he was White. In contrast, un-
prejudiced participants were more likely to make inter-
nal attributions for counterstereotypic behaviors per-
formed by Blacks than by Whites. These tendencies were
even more pronounced when time pressure was im-
posed on participants’ responding.
In contrast, more prejudiced participants displayed
a stereotype-confirming bias in their attributions,
which was most pronounced when they had limited time
to consider their responses. As in Experiment 2, the
stereotype-confirming bias was weak under control
conditions but emerged more strongly in this experi-
ment under conditions of time pressure. This suggests
that relatively controlled processes (e.g., those stem-
ming from self-presentational concerns) may have in-
fluenced attributions generated by participants in both
Experiment 2 and in the control condition of this
experiment.
An alternative interpretation of these results is sug-
gested by research reported by Chun, Spiegal, and
Kruglanski (2002). According to their work, cognitive
load can disrupt even early stages in the attributional
process. As discussed earlier, Gilbert et al. (1988) sug-
gested that correction, the last stage of the attributional
process, requires the most cognitive control and thus is
most vulnerable to interference. However, Chun et al.
(2002) propose that even the preliminary behavioral
identification (or classification) stage may be resource
dependent. Their research demonstrated that when the
behavioral identification task was difficult, it was suscep-
tible to constraints on cognitive capacity. In such
conditions, no dispositional inference was made.
In the present experiment, if prejudiced and unprej-
udiced participants differed in the ease with which they
classified Black stereotypic and counterstereotypic be-
haviors that were exhibited by Black and White targets,
they also might differ in the extent to which they made
internal attributions for those behaviors. Indeed, it may
seem plausible to assume that prejudiced participants
found it more difficult to classify the counterstereotypic
behaviors of Blacks than of Whites, leading them to draw
fewer dispositional inferences from them. However, it
seems improbable that even the least prejudiced individ-
ual would find it more difficult to classify stereotypic be-
haviors performed by Blacks than by Whites. Moreover,
the behavioral statements used in this research had been
pretested as having clear trait implications. Thus, it
seems unlikely that Chun et al.’s model would apply to
this experiment.
Thus, the results of Experiment 3 lend support to the
contention that unprejudiced individuals are motivated
to see stereotype-disconfirming evidence wherever it
may occur. When confronted with stereotype confirma-
tion, they attempt to discredit the value of that informa-
tion. In contrast, prejudiced individuals have no such
motivation to engage in stereotype disconfirmation.
Consequently for these individuals, stereotypes func-
tion in a similar manner to other expectancies and thus
guide attributions in an expectancy- (or stereotype-)
confirming way.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The Unprejudiced Person
and Stereotype-Disconfirming Biases
The three experiments reported here provide a clear
demonstration of a stereotype-disconfirming bias
among unprejudiced individuals. Past research has
focused its attention on stereotype confirmation as a
mechanism by which people are able to maintain their
stereotypes. This focus, although important, has perhaps
prevented consideration of the possibility that some in-
dividuals are motivated not to maintain their stereotypes
but to disconfirm them. The research reported in this
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article suggests that very unprejudiced individuals have
such a motivation. Not only do these individuals seek out
information that is most likely to provide stereotype
disconfirmation (Experiment 1), but they also systemati-
cally discount stereotype-consistent information while
drawing strong dispositional inferences from stereotype-
inconsistent information (Experiments 2 and 3). More-
over, these stereotype-disconfirming strategies appear to
proceed for unprejudiced participants even when cog-
nitive resources are limited.
How do unprejudiced individuals cultivate counter-
stereotypic expectancies? This would certainly seem to
contradict much of what is believed about the automatic
nature of stereotype-driven processes (Bargh, 1999;
Devine, 1989; but see also Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001;
Kawakami, Dion, & Dovidio, 1998; Locke, MacLeod, &
Walker, 1994; Rudman, Ashmore, & Gary, 2001). One
possibility is that people who hold strong unprejudiced
beliefs are well practiced at seeking nonstereotypic in-
formation (e.g., Blair & Banaji, 1996; Kawakami,
Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, & Russin, 2000) and at inhib-
iting stereotypes in any way available to them (e.g.,
Monteith et al., 1998). Repeatedly seeking to discount
stereotypic information, and attending to counter-
stereotypic information, may result in a high level of effi-
ciency when it comes to these processes (Bargh, 1997;
Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).
To What End, Disconfirmation?
Just as stereotype-confirming biases have a wide range
of consequences for stereotype maintenance and
change, prejudicial judgments, and discriminatory be-
havior, so too may stereotype-disconfirming biases. In-
deed, stereotype disconfirmation may be expected to
increase the likelihood of stereotype change. For exam-
ple, Johnston, Bristow, and Love (2000; see also
Johnston & Macrae, 1994) reported clear evidence that
participants who were given a situational explanation for
a stereotypic behavior by a single group member en-
gaged in less stereotyping than did participants who
were given a dispositional explanation for the same
behavior. Of interest, this difference in stereotype use
was found following exposure to a single situational
attribution. Thus, the effects of repeatedly generating
situational explanations may be much more far
reaching.
Stereotype-disconfirming attributional biases may
have further implications for judgment and behavior.
Sekaquaptewa and her colleagues (Sekaquaptewa et al.,
2003; von Hippel et al., 1997) have provided a great deal
of evidence that biases in information processing (e.g.,
the stereotype explanatory and linguistic intergroup bi-
ases) are predictive of prejudicial judgments and dis-
criminatory behavior. As the converse of the stereotype-
confirming bias that they have explored, stereotype-
disconfirming biases may well predict positive biases
in judgments of (as well as prosocial behavior toward)
members of a stereotyped group. In fact, Sekaquaptewa
et al. (2003) have reported results consistent with this
proposal.
Is Stereotype Disconfirmation the Answer?
The preceding discussion may leave the impression
that stereotype-disconfirming attributional biases pro-
mote decidedly positive effects on stereotype change,
prejudice reduction, and positive intergroup behavior.
However, recent research suggests some potential pit-
falls of the stereotype-disconfirmation bias. For exam-
ple, Yzerbyt, Corneille, Dumont, and Hahn (2001) have
reported an intriguing series of experiments in which
they demonstrated that generating a situational attribu-
tion for a behavior entails the simultaneous suppression
of the dispositional attribution that would otherwise be
made. Ironically, the suppressed dispositional attribu-
tion is likely to rebound in subsequent judgments, mak-
ing later dispositional inferences more likely to occur.
An interesting question stemming from this work is
whether participants who are well practiced at mak-
ing situational attributions in a particular context are
equally vulnerable to these rebound effects.
In another program of research, Seta, Seta, and
McElroy (2003) proposed that when individuals encoun-
ter stereotype-disconfirming behaviors in one group
member, they are likely to compensate for the discon-
firmation by judging other group members in more ste-
reotypic ways. This compensation allows the group ste-
reotype to be maintained. In the studies they reported,
participants were not allowed to discount the initial
stereotype-disconfirming event. One might expect that
being unable to explain away stereotype-inconsistent in-
formation, participants might have adjusted their stereo-
types accordingly. On the contrary, however, participants
apparently became even more motivated to engage in
stereotype confirmation at the first available opportu-
nity. Thus, it appears that stereotype disconfirmation
must be pursued intentionally and voluntarily if it is to
result in diminished stereotype use.
Conclusions
The unprejudiced person is not merely someone who
is free from prejudice and its corresponding biases. She
or he is, in fact, susceptible to many of the same biases in
information processing as are prejudiced individuals. It
is the content, rather than the process, of the bias that
shapes the outcomes produced, in terms of beliefs, judg-
ments, and behaviors. The research reported in these
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pages highlights some of the strategies that unpreju-
diced individuals use to meet their goals of stereotype
disconfirmation. Indeed, they are precisely those strate-
gies that have long been held accountable for stereotype
maintenance.
NOTES
1. The role of prejudice in stereotype disconfirmation, proposed
here, should be distinguished from the construct of motivation to con-
trol prejudice, proposed by Fazio and his colleagues (Dunton & Fazio,
1997; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Towles-Schwen &
Fazio, 2003). Motivation to control prejudice refers to the dual motiva-
tions of avoiding conflict regarding one’s stereotypic beliefs and of
avoiding the appearance of prejudice. Both of these concerns are
somewhat self-presentational in nature. Plant and Devine (1998;
Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 2002) have similarly
argued for the role of motivation in controlling prejudiced reactions.
In their view, individuals vary in both internal and external sources of
motivation to behave in unprejudiced ways. The proposals of both
Dunton and Fazio (1997) and of Plant and Devine (1998) concern the
reduction of bias in overt judgments of and behaviors toward Blacks. In
contrast, the unprejudiced individual who seeks disconfirmation of
cultural stereotypes does so to maintain his or her personal beliefs
regarding the illegitimacy of those stereotypes.
2. The theoretical range of scores on the Modern Racism Scale
(MRS) is –14 (extremely unprejudiced) to +14 (extremely prejudiced). The
actual range of scores in this study was –14 to +2 (M = –7.701, SD =
4.074).
3. Logistic regression utilizes one category (i.e., level of the de-
pendent variable) as a reference group for generating parameter esti-
mates for the remaining categories. Because there is no clear logic in
using any particular target as a reference group for the others, binary
logistic regressions were conducted to interpret the results. Parameter
estimates (Bs) are evaluated using a Wald statistic. The Wald statistic is
equal to (B/SE)2 and has a chi-square distribution with 1 degree of
freedom.
4. Because this study (as well as Experiments 2 and 3) involved a
repeated-measures design, MANCOVA is used instead of multiple re-
gression. Here, and in the following two experiments, MRS is entered
as a covariate. Although the default model tested in this type of analysis
is one in which the effects of the covariate are simply controlled for, it is
also possible to specify a model in which interactions involving the
covariate are tested. In such a model, separate regression lines are fit
for the covariate (in this case, MRS) on each dependent variable (in
this case, each level of the repeated measure “trait type”). The inter-
action tests for homogeneity of these regression lines. Thus, to the
extent that the slopes are significantly different, this will be indicated
by significant interactions. The same analytic strategy will be followed
in Experiments 2 and 3.
5. MRS scores for Experiment 2 ranged from –14 to +9 (M = –6.650,
SD = 5.574).
6. MRS scores for Experiment 3 ranged from –14 to +6 (M = –6.735,
SD = 4.909).
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